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Given the lively debate on the consequences of British colonialism on
the Indian economy in the realms of contemporary politics and academia,
this paper attempts to trace the development of the economic history of
India since the 18th century with a distinct focus on the drain theory
of wealth and the question of deindustrialisation. It examines a diverse
set of academic publications on this subject and compares the evidence
shown by a wide range of authors to arrive at possible conclusions. It is
found that the composition of the drain theory of wealth was critically
questioned by scholars both home and abroad, and its set of core suppo-
sitions remain unsubstantiated. On the other hand, the evidence for the
deindustrialisation hypothesis is found to be significant, at least for the
regions of Gangetic Bihar and Bengal, during the early 19th century.
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1 Introduction
The British Raj’s legacy in the Indian subcontinent is often analysed from an economic
lens. The anti colonial mobilisation in the 19th and the early 20th century was in part
based around the systematic exploitation of the indigenous artisans and the workers,
and the destruction of the textile industry. An essential instrument of this mobilisation,
which took place in various forms, was the conception of the deindustrialisation theory
and the drain theory of wealth by the anti colonial academics. In spite of the fact that
Dadabhai Naoroji was the first one to methodically articulate the drain theory of
wealth and give it substantial currency in the political sphere, the actual birth of the
drain theory goes further back. 20 years before Naoroji delivered his famous lecture
titled ‘England’s Duties to India’ to the East India Association, London in 1867,
a group of Maharashtrian intellectuals of the nationalist tradition including Bhaskar
Pandurang Tarkhadkar, Govind Vitthal Kunte and Ramkrishna Vishwanath had posed
the economic implications of the British Raj’s policies as the primary evil facing the
Indian people (Naik 2001). The structural destruction of the handloom industry in
India was also noted by Karl Marx in one of his essays published in the New York Daily
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Tribune in 1853.1 In present-time India, contemporary politicians like Shashi Tharoor
have played a major part in popularising the argument for reparations in the public
imagination. His famous speech at the Oxford Union in favour of the motion “This
house believes Britain owes reparations to her former colonies” garnered over 8 million
views on Youtube and also invited a comment of approval from India’s Prime Minister
Narendra Modi.2 Economist Utsa Patnaik’s recent contribution in Agrarian and Other
Histories published by the Columbia University Press, which was covered widely by
both western and domestic media, included a measurement of the drain during the
British Raj which amounted to $45 trillion.3 It is, therefore, clear that the debate
on the economic implications of British colonialism in India is still relevant in the
public discourse. Over the course of the last seven decades, the academic literature
on this subject has gone under a gradual evolution and the growing research has
enabled scholars to reconstruct popular theories with fresh constraints and realities.
Different authors have devised different ways to measure and define these theories,
and have arrived at several different results. This provides a pertinent opportunity to
economic historians to grapple with these ideas and explore their evidence in detail.
The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of the existing literature and provide
a comprehensive review of the same.
2 The Drain Theory
2.1 Pre Independence
The anti-colonial sentiment had started to grow in the collective conscience of the
public in the mid 19th century. The Bombay Gazette made a call on 1st July 1841 for
submissions from its readers who were interested in publishing their dissent against
the British Government. Bhaskar Tarkhadkar was one of the many people who sub-
mitted their scathing critiques of the Raj to the English daily. But what distinguished
him from the rest was his emphasis on the drain of wealth from India at the hands of
the colonial government. In his appraisal of Bhaskar Tarkhadkar’s work, historian JV
Naik wrote:
Being journalistic, their account of India’s growing impoverishment un-
der British rule, is not as systematic as that of the later drain theorists.
Nevertheless, it contained all the component elements that constituted
the drain: decline of the indigenous industry, transfer of wealth, exces-
sive taxation, over assessment of land, non employment of the Indians in
important civil and military positions and excessively costly character
of British administration.(Naik 2001)
In particular, Tarkhadkar observed the woeful condition of the Konkani weavers, and
the export of raw materials to England for cheap and the subsequent import of finished
products in India at high prices. The unfavourable balance of trade between India and
England was also pointed out by Ramakrishna Vishwanath. Their fellow intellectual






landless labourers and petty peasants which effectively left them helpless in front of
the khoti-zamindars (Naik 2001).
The most familiar, and perhaps the most influential, name associated with the
concept of drain is that of Dadabhai Naoroji. His first academic work on the drain
theory of wealth was Poverty and the Unbritish Rule in India published in 1901. By
his own admission, the concept of drain was not entirely original. He cited the work of
several British scholars to support the claim that the British government was indeed
draining India of its wealth. In particular, Montgomery Martin’s remarks on the state
of parts of Bengal and Bihar in the period 1807-1814 were especially telling:
It is impossible to avoid remarking two facts as peculiarly striking—first
the richness of the country surveyed and second, the poverty of its inhab-
itants.. The annual drain of £3,000,000 on British India has mounted
in thirty years at 12 percent, (the usual indian rate )compound interest
to the enormous sum of $723,900,000 sterling....so constant and accu-
mulating a drain, even in England, would soon impoverish her. How
severe then must be its effects on India when the wage of a labourer is
from two pence to three pence a day.” He also calculates the result of
the drain of £.5,000,000 a year. What then must be or can be the effect
of the unceasing drain which has now grown to the enormous amount
of £30,000,000 a year, if not famines and plagues, destruction and im-
poverishment. (Naoroji 1901)
The drain theory in its initial form was understandably crude and unsophisticated. It
was thought of as simply the excess of exports over imports. But unlike other schol-
ars, Naoroji also characterised the profit on the exports from India as a factor of the
drain (Chandra 1965). According to the methodology used by him in Poverty and
the Unbritish Rule in India, the amount of drain in the period 1835-1872 came out to
be at least £200,000,000. This did not include any interest payment, which according
to him would have greatly increased the drain. Other important constituents of the
drain included the expenditure on the British armed forces, remittances and other
allowances to the civil servants which were essentially borne by the Indian taxpayers
(Dasgupta 1993). The early conceptualisation of the drain theory was met with criti-
cism from both British and Indian scholars. The most popular retort from the British
side of the argument came from Sir Theodore Morrison. In Economic Transition in
India, he observed that while there was certainly an excess of exports over imports,
the extent of the drain was grossly overstated, evidenced by the fact that the import
of gold and silver was not accounted for. But as (Dasgupta 1993) points out, the
import of treasure was included in the drain calculation by the likes of Gopal Krishna
Gokhale. At home, the drain theory was questioned by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee
and Mahadev Govind Ranade. While Chatterjee had his reservations against the as-
sertion that the drain had induced poverty in the Bengal rural economy, Ranade was
of the opinion that there were other serious economic problems to be focused upon
and that the drain theory was ultimately a matter of politics (Dasgupta 1993). The
only other scholar who came close to the stature of Dadabhai Naoroji was Romesh
Chunder Dutt. In the volume II of The Economic History of India, he wrote:
The richest country on earth stoops to levy this annual contribution
from the poorest. Those who earn £42 per head ask for 10s. per head
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from a nation earning £2 per head. And this I0s. per head which the
British people draw from India impoverishes Indians, and therefore im-
poverishes British trade with India. The contribution does not benefit
British commerce and trade, while it drains the life-blood of India in a
continuous, ceaseless flow. (Dutt 1904)
One of his major insights was the emphasis on the economic drain caused by the export
of food supply without adequate payment. He calculated a sum of 20 million sterlings
between 1891-92 and 1896-97 as the total drain from food supply. This, according to
him, was the major cause of the impoverishment of Indians (Dutt 1904). Some scholars
have also attempted to paint a picture of the drain in the late 18th century. Using the
data published by the Committee of Secrecy in 1773, Rama Dev Roy suggested that
the East India Company’s magnitude of investment in India provided an estimate of
the drain as it was financed by the “territorial revenue” from Bengal. Between 1762
and 1771, the total amount of investment was found to be £8,394,000 (R. D. Roy 1987).
2.2 Post Independence
After the independence of India in 1947, economic historians put special emphasis on
the estimation of the national income of India to answer the question of drain. This
unsurprisingly resulted in multiple different estimates due to varying methodologies.
In 1950, Daniel Thorner took up the job of analysing nine of all the different estimates
of India’s national income. He found that the estimates differed from each other to
such an extent that a comparison wasn’t possible (Raychaudhuri 1966).
In his unflattering review of V. Shanmugasundaram’s volume The Drain Theory
written for the Indian Economic Association, which included Subrata Chakravarty’s
The Drain Theory of Dadabhai Naoroji, MM. Khullar’s Drain in Perpetuity, AC.
Minocha’s Drain Theory and its Relevance to Present Day Trade Relations between
Developed and Under-Developed Countries and Rural-Urban Sectors, Dharma Kumar
wrote:
The choice of the subject was a good one. Economists can contribute
to it in two ways: by using the tools of economics to analyse concepts
of exploitation, forced exports and so forth, and by working out balance
of payments figures which would enable one to measure the ”drain”,
however defined, during a particular period. But instead we are given
stale rhetoric and a repetition of well worn arguments and out-of-date
figures. For instance, OP. Mahajan’s ”The Drain Theory: Fact and Fic-
tion” makes no use of the balance of payments estimates of AK. Baner-
jee. Again, during the discussion one economist took it for granted that
”there was no possibility of economic growth in the Nineteenth Century
in India because of the institutional obstructions which impeded growth
and apparently no one pointed out that other views are held. (Kumar
1971)
An underappreciated insight on the nature of the trade between India and England
was provided by BR Tomlinson. In the late 19th and the early 20th century, India’s
share in the total imports of England stood at less than 10%. As a corollary of this
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simple observation, he further noted that the share of England in the total exports
from India declined from 33% to 25% between 1890 and 1911. On the other hand,
India’s exports to other industrial nations were increasing at the same time and were
characterised by a distinct colonial undertone. Although Britain’s general relationship
with India at the time was colonial in nature, their bilateral trade, which mostly in-
cluded semi manufactured goods, did not adequately reflect this fact (Tomlinson 1975).
It was also observed by (Kumar 1983) that there was a lack of reliable data for the
major components of the drain such as “profits and interest remitted abroad, freight
and insurance payments, home charges and so forth.” It could be inferred from the
data on foreign trade that there was indeed an economic drain from India in the first
half of the 19th century, but this did not necessarily cause the impoverishment of the
Indian people.
2.3 The 21st Century
Modern economic historians like Tirthankar Roy and KN Chaudhuri have tended to
disregard the drain theory with both qualitative and empirical arguments. Chaudhuri
described the approach taken by Naoroji and Dutt as “extremely confused and largely
coloured by political feelings.” He further pointed out that not only had Naoroji ig-
nored capital flows and invisible payments in the balance of payments account, he also
did not take into account the positive effects of exports on domestic income, evidenced
by substantial imports of monetary silver. In summary, even if it was proved that there
existed transfer payments from India to England without adequate compensation, its
effect was not strong enough to depress economic growth in India (Chadhuri 2003).
Roy defined ‘drain’ as the payment for British goods and services—such as interest on
public debt, salaries, and pensions paid to government officers—by India above the fair
price. These payments were made from the export surplus and ultimately there was
no meaningful way of knowing whether these payments were above the fair price. The
discourse surrounding the drain theory spent a disproportionate amount of energy on
the state when in reality it was a miniscule part of the economy; its share of total em-
ployment was only 2%. He further highlighted the fact that in the periods 1857-1865
and 1872-1884, India did make payments without appropriate compensation but the
exact magnitude of such transactions was difficult to ascertain. Henceforth, however,
all the payments made by India to England were in accordance with the value of a
particular good or a service (T. Roy 2019)
3 The Deindustrialisation Debate
The subject of deindustrialisation is closely related to the premise of the drain the-
ory, however it has a distinct economic character of its own. It generally refers to a
secular decline in the manufacturing employment and output, as well as simultane-
ous movement of the workforce to the rural economy due to a multitude of causes.
Although it’s unclear when the first conceptualisation of deindustrialisation occurred,
Karl Marx’s article in the New York Herald Tribune in 1853 was perhaps the first well
known mention of deindustrialisation in India. In its issue on 10 June 18534, he wrote:
4. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm
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It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and
destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian
cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hin-
dostan, and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton
with cottons. From 1818 to 1836 the export of twist from Great Britain
to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. In 1824 the export of
British muslins to India hardly amounted to 1,000,000 yards, while in
1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 of yards. But at the same time the pop-
ulation of Dacca decreased from 150,000 inhabitants to 20,000. This
decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the
worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole
surface of Hindostan, the union between agriculture and manufacturing
industry.
The destruction of the cotton textile industry was a very consequential observation
in the development of this subject. One of the first scholarly works on deindustrial-
isation in India came from Daniel Thorner. He noted that while the evidence for a
systematic deindustrialisation in the period 1881-1931 was scant, it was indeed true
that the Indian handicraft industry had suffered a degradation. However, this was
simply a consequence of the superiority of industrial scale production and such an
effect was not particularly unique to India either (Thorner and Thorner 1962). In a
response to this, Amiya Kumar Bagchi duly pointed out why India’s case was special.
The decline of the handicraft industry in Britain and Germany was caused by their
own industrial revolutions which enabled them to absorb the unemployed labour in
a new industry. On the contrary, no such fresh employment was being generated in
the colonies and the destruction of the handicrafts resulted in the permanent unem-
ployment of many (Bagchi 1976). Morris D Morris made an unanticipated argument
with respect to employment in the handicraft industry. He showed that the absolute
number of handloom weavers, in fact, increased in the period 1800-1947, with mild
fluctuations in between. His inspection of the official statistics in 1950 revealed that
the total number of people employed in the industry was 4,688,000 in India and Pak-
istan, with 3,125,000 of them being actively engaged in handloom weaving. Given
that the total population in 1800 was somewhere around 103-125 millions and that
the proportion of weavers in the labour force (50-62 millions) would have been between
7.6% and 9.4%, it was incredibly likely that there was an expansion of employment in
the handloom industry in the subsequent century. Further, there was some evidence
to believe that the per capita consumption of cotton as well as the yarn available for
consumption might have increased since 1800. If there was no technological advance-
ment in the industry, as was the case with the handloom industry in India, then such
a development implied “either expansion in the number of weavers or increase in full-
time employment of weavers, or both” (Morris 1968). However, (Simmons 1985) drew
attention to the fact that Morris had fixated, for whatever reason, much of the focus
on cotton, jute, iron and steel industries and looked past the “less glamorous” ones.
A peculiar finding remarked upon by (Krishnamurthy 1976) was “the possibility of
a simultaneous deindustrialisation and deagriculturalisation” based on the estimates
computed by Raghabendra Chattopadhyay. Krishnamurthy termed this conclusion—a
decline in employment in both the manufacturing sector as well as the agricultural sec-
tor—as an “oddity”. Additionally, his investigation showed that while the proportion
of males working in the manufacturing industry fell from 9.1% to 8.4% in the period
1911-1931, the manufacturing increased both as a share of the total output and in per
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capita terms. Thus, it was unreasonable to accept the deindustrialisation hypothesis
for the given period.
Bagchi’s seminal contribution to the literature was the examination of regional
variation in the deindustrialisation debate, focusing on Gangetic Bihar which covered
Bhagalpur, Patna-Gaya, Purnea, and Shahabad. With the help of the data collected
by Francis Buchanan Hamilton, he determined the total population as well as the
share of population dependent on the manufacturing industry in the years 1809-1813
and compared it with the figures for 1901. It disclosed that there was an obvious
fall in the population dependent on the manufacturing industry by more than half,
the dominant component of which was the textile industry. The primary reason why
Gangetic Bihar’s case was unique was the fact that it absorbed a large chunk of the
traditional industry in the region. At an all India level, there was certainly a decline
in the employment of cotton spinners, who were much greater in number than the
cotton weavers (Bagchi 1976). However, the empirical inferences asserted by Bagchi,
specifically with respect to the census data collected by Francis Buchanan Hamilton,
were questioned by Marika Vicziany. Firstly, the census did not collect domain specific
employment data, without which it was hard to separate agricultural and industry em-
ployment. The simple division between rural and urban employment did not reliably
show sector wise employment because a lot of people who lived in the urban areas
were involved in agriculture. Secondly, the manner in which occupations in the Indian
census were defined changed considerably in the period 1881-1931. And lastly, the
characterisation of the 19th century Indian economy as being a typical three sector
economy with agriculture, manufacturing and services was perhaps a dubious one,
since in reality it was “predominantly agrarian and preindustrial” and there was a
sizable intersection among the three sectors regarding employment (Vicziany 1979).
In his defense, (Bagchi 1979) responded to this critique by making it clear that he had
“reclassified the Census population of 1901 with occupations in class D so as to make it
conform more closely to the concept of secondary industry.” The change in definitions
of the occupation did not prove to be a hindrance as Buchanan Hamilton’s census had
extensive information on the income and background characteristics of the artisans.
In fact, this change in definitions and intersection of different occupations itself was
caused by the degradation of the manufacturing industry at the hands of the colonial
government. Against this backdrop of occupational structure, it was observed by Peter
Harnetty that the handloom weavers were, in fact, a heterogenous group, unlike what
was assumed by scholars before, and that their experiences were different from one
another. This was largely a product of the elaborate caste system prevalent among the
Hindus which consisted of several weaving castes. For instance, the Koshtis produced
high quality silk products using advanced machinery, the Koris and the Mahars pro-
duced coarse cloth, and the Momins from Burhanpur, who were Muslim weavers, were
famous for weaving silver and gold wires into the cloth. The social stratification of
the caste system reflected in the outcomes of the deindustrialisation in the early 19th
century—the Koshtis and the Momins were able to survive the undesirable effects,
while those confined to the villages like the Mahars had to either engage in low skilled
part time jobs or change their occupation altogether. The emergence of the credit
market, brought about by the adoption of industrial scale production of cloth, meant
that the weavers had lost their fiscal autonomy to the intermediaries (Harnetty 1991).
This insight on the unequal outcomes of deindustrialisation was extended upon by
(T. Roy 2001), who added that the class of artisans who became worse off were the
7
cotton weavers as opposed to the silk weavers who were able to survive. This was, to
a great degree, a function of the competition with the Lancashire cotton mills who
specialised in producing coarse and fine cloths. David Clingingsmith and Jeffrey G
Williamson employed a three sector Neo-Ricardian Model—with textiles (T), grain
(G), and agricultural commodity exports (C)—to examine the role of local supply side
forces in enabling deindustrialisation in India. They classified the process of deindus-
trialisation into two periods—1760-1810 and 1810-1860. Between 1760 and 1810, it
was found that the collapse of the Mughal empire and unfavourable climatic condi-
tions were primarily responsible for the depression in the agricultural sector, which
ultimately led to a decline in India’s comparative advantage in the textile industry.
The Industrial Revolution had reached its mature stage by 1840 and thus a good deal of
India’s domestic textile market was occupied by England in the second period. Hence-
forth, however, a combination of factors ranging from improved climatic conditions to
a downturn in the nominal wages and grain prices in India, caused a mild reindustrial-
isation until 1913 (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2008). Indrajit Ray put an explicit
focus on the experience of Bengal in the 18th and the 19th centuries. The evidence
suggests that much of the deindustrialisation in Bengal started from the mid 1820s,
discarding the hypothesis that places the start in the early 1810s or even further back
in the 18th century. The magnitude of depression in the Bengal economy followed an
upward trend “with a loss of employment of 65,000 in the 1820s, 144,000 in the 1830s,
and 160,000 in the 1840” and by 1860, a total of 563000 workers had been displaced
from their engagement in the economy. Although the British government’s discrimi-
natory tariff policy reduced the competitiveness of the cotton produced in Bengal, the
primary cause of deindustrialisation was the huge influx of British cotton in the Indian
market, spurred by the technological advances in the British industries (Ray 2009).
Tirthankar Roy expressed apprehensions towards a few subsets of the deindustri-
alisation phenomenon, like the supposed degradation of the iron and steel industry
in India in the late 18th century. The definite increase in the imports of iron goods
can be explained by the fact that the Indian industry seldom produced cannons, guns,
cutlery and construction material, which were the principal component of the imports.
He also offered a more nuanced perspective on the developments in the 18th and the
19th century, breaking past the often perpetuated binary—that there was a diverse set
of workers out of which some prospered and some declined, that the winners gained as
much, if not more, as the losers lost, and that the reason for this survival was that the
competition between machinery and handloom was restricted to a limited number of
goods such as the “coarse medium cotton cloth and the printed and bleached cotton
cloth”. Moreover, there were certain products like the fine cotton yarn and the saris
made out of bordered cloth which the handloom was more adept at manufacturing
than the machinery (T. Roy 2020).
4 Conclusion
This subset of Indian economic history is especially gifted with a diverse body of
scholarly work and an extensive set of academic dialogue. Any review of such a subject
requires the perusal of evidence spread across the ideological spectrum. The richness
of this subject lies in the fact that proponents of conflicting schools of thought have
often tended to accept partial findings of each other. For instance, the development
of the anti colonial movement saw a fascinating intersection between the Marxist and
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the Nationalist academics with respect to the investigation of the economic policy
of the colonial government (Ray 2015). Overtime, the analysis of India’s economic
history has gradually shifted from an anti-colonial theoretical framework to a more
economic theory based approach—the microfoundations of labour economics, decision
making under uncertainty and trade theory are some of the concepts that have been
employed to interpret the experiences of former colonies. As far as the drain theory is
concerned, it appears that much of the construct upon which it was built failed to has
stand up to scrutiny by modern economic historians. Although it’s unquestionably true
that India’s preeminence in the world economy was artificially degenerated by British
imperialism, the specific mechanism via which this happened does not correspond to
the one articulated by the drain theorists. Any critique of an event should, at the very
least, involve the demonstration of a point which is falsifiable. The drain theory, even
at its best, does not follow this basic rule because it’s an unattainable task to ascertain
whether the transactions between India and England were asymmetrical. Much of the
shortcomings of the British Raj, as (T. Roy 2019) argues, lay in its highly inefficient
welfare state where it unwisely spent the government revenue (mobilised by taxing
peasants) on protectionist policies back home instead of developmental programs in
India. As a result, the businesses came out as the winners while the rural poor and
the women remained in a state of destitute and even got worse off than before. The
evidence for deindustrialisation, on the other hand, is more convincing, though not
without several limitations. There were multiple different regional experiences, each
with a specific cause and effect relationship and time period. Amiya Kumar Bagchi and
Indrajit Ray, for instance, have made compelling arguments for the case of Gangetic
Bihar and Bengal respectively. Consequently, it’s perhaps unreasonable to employ
the concept of deindustrialisation as a universal experience faced by India in any
meaningful way.
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